Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to conceptualization and measurement of democracy. The headquarters-the V-Dem Institute-is based at the University of Gothenburg with 17 staff. The project includes a worldwide team with six Principal Investigators, 14 Project Managers, 30 Regional Managers, 170 Country Coordinators, Research Assistants, and 3,000 Country Experts. The V-Dem project is one of the largest ever social science research-oriented data collection programs.
Introduction
On February 15th, 2019, President Donald Trump declared a national emergency on the southern border of the United States in an effort to circumvent Congressional will regarding the construction of a border wall. Although this is the 59th declared national emergency under the National Emergencies Act, it's character has been challenged as out of line with previous practice, and his decision was met with fierce criticism. For instance, 58 ex-senior security officials have call this move "at odds with the overwhelming evidence in the public record, including the administrations own data and estimates."
1 However, while such actions are uncommon in throughout US history, President Trump is not the first democratically elected leader to be challenged for his use of emergency powers.
On people accused of plotting a failed coup, fired more than 140,000 people from their jobs, shut down 1,500 civil groups, and virtually removed freedom of the press by arresting journalists and closing independent media outlets (Kingsley 2017) . Though the state of emergency was scheduled to last for three months, the state of emergency persisted until July 2018 -over two full years -when Erdogan had won reelection. Through the use of his emergency 1 cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2019/images/02/25/2019-2-21.final.national.emergency.decl.pdf powers, Erdogan has de-facto transformed Turkey into a presidential dictatorship (Esen & Gumuscu 2017 ).
The extension of political power to the executive in times of real or manufactured crisis is not contained to the US or the Turkish case. Constitutions frequently allow the executive to centralize power when confronted by a heightened threat (Rossiter 1948 , Ferejohn & Pasquino 2004 . From 1800 to 2012, 80 democracies adopted such provisions for the state of emergency -formal legal acts that dictate the shifting roles of state actors and institutions during times of international or domestic crisis. This accounts for over half of all democratic country-years during this time period. The descent of Turkey into dictatorship demonstrates how the effects of a state of emergency can be quite dramatic and long-lasting.
However, outside an examination of early cases (Rossiter 1948) , we know very little about the relationship of the state of exception to autocratization. This is a notable omission in the literature. Autocratization -the gradual or sudden decline of democratic regime attributes -is on the rise globally (Mechkova, Lührmann & Lindberg 2017) . It is therefore vital to understand better how autocratization unfolds and which factors foster the decline of democracy. States of emergency may well be a crucial piece in this puzzle. They present an opportunity for wanna-be dictators to assume more power under the veneer of constitutional legitimacy. Once in place, they give leaders -such as Erdogan -the power to mute dissent and centralize political authority. At the same time, chief excecutives with the intent to dismantle democracy can be considered more likely to invoke a state of emergency and -once it is in place -abuse the extraordinary powers that typically come with it. Like a fever, states of emergency are both a symptom and an accelerator of democratic decline. As a result, we expect that countries are likely affected by substantial autocratization when a state of emergency is declared as opposed to when not. We proceed as follows. First, we discuss the origins and application of states of emergency. We take specific note of how states of emergency empower executives. Then, we discuss the state of the art on the relationship between states of emergency and autocratization followed by the development of our theoretical argument. Subsequently we introduce our data sources and research design. The final sections discusses the empirical findings and conclusions.
The Origins of the State of Exception
The state of exception in modern states trace back to the Roman Republic, where in times of national emergency, the Roman consuls would nominate a dictator who had nearly absolute power to take action free from the standard political institutions (Rossiter 1948 ).
Today, emergency provisions are common institutional features of democratic states with a variety of constitutional arrangements, designed to overcome restraints on necessary action during periods of national distress.
Scholars suggest that those who build the institutions within democracies view centralized executive power in wartime as a necessary evil, compromising some democratic principles to enhance national security in the event that a substantial or existential external threat arises (Rossiter 1948 , Ferejohn & Pasquino 2004 . In order to properly study emergency provisions, we need to understand where they come from and how and why they are more extensive in some cases than others. Though there are few direct accounts of the decision to adopt emergency provisions in modern states, historical accounts of constitution-making in democracies and considerations of factors that exacerbate emergencies suggest several factors that influence the decision to adopt emergency powers and the decision of how strong the executive must be to sufficiently handle an emergency situation.
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The first determinant of the provision of a state of emergency is the strength of the executive in times of peace. Leaders that face particularly strong domestic constraints on their actions during peacetime require greater freedom of action to overcome emergency situations.
This should be especially true in the case of states with a strong separation of powers and complex governments. While such institutions are inherent in many modern democracies, the predominant example of such decision-making is the provision for dictatorship in the Roman Republic. As Rome had a complex constitutional system featuring an unparalleled division of administrative authority, as well as a great number of checks on executive action during times of peace, the Roman dictator had nearly absolute power to combat a national emergency (Rossiter 1948) . Emergency powers historically result from the desire to break deadlock, and thus systems with a greater potential for institutional gridlock are more likely to allow for the provision of a state of emergency.
States often provide for a state of exception when the nation's standard democratic institutions have proven unable to combat domestic discord or internal strife. This is evident in the Venezuelan Constitution of 1961. Venezuela's constitutional framers, like those many in nascent democracies, had clear memories of the nation's previous experience with autocracy and had to consider its long history of domestic coups and military intervention in the government (Manrique 1988 that the constraints on the executive had undermined his ability to enact necessary policies in the face of an external existential threat (Foyer 1988 ). France's constitutional process thereby granted immense power to the president in times of emergency to ensure that such calamity does not again occur. In the case of the Greek Constitution of 1975, Greece's longheld rivalry with Turkey over Cyprus demonstrated the government's consistent inability to gain the upper hand on their persistent opponent (Tsatsos 1988) . Constitutional framers therefore sought strongly to enact provisions to ensure that future governments would have both the freedom and the power necessary to prosecute future disputes with Turkey. There is thus an obvious connection between a state's historical experience and its willingness to institute provisions for a state of exception.
States of Emergency and Executive Empowerment
The experiences that lead states to enact provisions for a state of emergency also inform However, many emergency provisions dramatically alter the political landscape through granting the leader broad, sweeping power. The Taiwanese Case studies provide some insights that states of emergency have helped to break down democracies or orchestrate further retraction in autocracies for instance in Latin America (Loveman 1993 , Wright 2015 , Asia (Ramraj & Thiruvengadam 2009 ), Egypt (Reza 2007) , Ethiopia (Toggia 2008) and Turkey (Göztepe 2018) . To our knowledge, no prior comparative study exists on how incumbents use states of emergencies to foster autocratization. Most studies on emergency powers do not include systematic comparisons of de-facto effects (for a seminal example see Gross & Aoláin (2006) ). The classical work on emergency powers in the field of legal and philosophical studies emphasized the danger of 'constitutional dictatorships' turning 'unconstitutional' when leaders abused their powers to undermine democratic institutions (Watkins 1940 , Rossiter 1948 , Friedrich 1950 
Theory: How states of emergency are linked to autocratization
States of emergency provide an opportunity structure for leaders to subvert democratic rule as it reduces the costs associated with such actions. In normal times, the expansion of executive power -particularly if done rapidly -is risky for leaders. In periods of emergency, the expansion of executive power is expected. States of emergency allow to the leader to combat an immediate threat to the nation by making use of previously unavailable powers. This, by itself, need not erode democracy. If the use of powers is constrained to truly existential threats to the nation, and the state returns to its standard institutions after the emergency subsides, the state of emergency has performed its function well, and democracy remained unchallenged. However, as we have described, under the state of emergency, leaders have the opportunity to both extend their control past the realm of the emergency and even past the duration of the emergency.
Thus, states of emergency are an ideal tool to undermine democracy under the disguise of democratic and constitutional legitimacy. Prior research clearly shows that most democracies erode slowly in recent decades. In a day and age where multi-party elections have become the global norm, even dictators invest a lot in appearing as democratic as possible (Bermeo 2016 . Sudden moves towards autocracy -such as military coupsrisk to trigger mass uprisings or international interventions. Thus, wanna-be dictators rather manipulate elections and gradually expand their power.
A state of emergency not only gives leaders the opportunity to do so, but also a good argument for why they need more power. Why should they have to bother with human rights and legislative or other institutional constraints while the country is under attack? Thus, states of emergencies can help to dismantle democracy and subvert resistance to its demise. The opposition can easily be labeled as unpatriotic for challenging the government at a time when the state is imperiled and unity is required. Such proclamations were made by Indira Ghandi's government after it declared a state of emergency in 1971 in response to war with Pakistan but allowed emergency conditions to persist well after the war had ended.
Gaining more power over state resources is a key reason why incumbents push their country towards autocracy (Bermeo 2016) . For instance, the Peruvian president Fujimori decided to dissolve the parliament in 1992 and assume dictatorial powers out of frustration about the need to compromise with other actors under democratic rule (Bermeo 2003) . Two different sets of constraints on incumbents are common in democracies a modern public administration and accountability relationships . First, a modern public administrationthe rule of law and an impartial public administration -limits incumbents access to state resources (Merkel 2010) . Thus, even though they have reached the most powerful state office, incumbents cannot arbitrarily use state resources for their personal ends or without following a prescribed set of procedures. Second, various accountability relationships constrain the power of elected officials in democracies. It is common to distinguish between vertical (related to elections and political parties), horizontal (checks and balances between institutions), and diagonal (media and civil society) dimensions of accountability (Mechkova, Lührmann & Lindberg 2017) . States of emergency can help leaders to subvert such constraints.
At the same time, states of emergency are more likely to be declared in times of political instability, which also has the potential to enhance the likelihood of democratic erosion. If, during a period of instability, a leader declares an emergency to combat the instability and in doing so constrains the freedom of action of the opposition, this will likely be seen as an important derogation from democracy by the opposition and perhaps the public. The In sum, authoritarian-leaning chief executives in democracies should both be more likely to declare a state of emergency, reach power during a state of emergency and, once it is declared, abuse the powers it grants to dismantle democratic institutions. Therefore, we expect states of emergency to be associated with a heightened risk of autocratization -substantial declines in democratic regime attributes.
Research Design and Data

Dependent variable: Autocratization year
To capture the often-gradual process of autocratization, we use V-Dems Electoral Democracy Index (EDI), which measures the extent to which a regime achieves the core institutional requirements in Dahls (1971 Dahls ( , 1998 There were 54 autocratization episodes in the V-Dem sample of democracies from 1974 to 2016 (roughly 6% of all county-year observations).
Independent variable: States of emergency
We use data on declared states of emergency from Hafner-Burton, Helfer and Fariss (2011). They have coded a binary variable on whether or not a country was in a state of emergency based on the State Department's annual human rights reports for 1974 to 2006. 8 .
We have updated their data for 2007-2016 based on the same source and for the United 7 A change of 10% is an intuitive choice for a cut-off point on a continuous, zero to one index. It is demanding enough to minimize the risk of measurement error or minor changes are driving the results. At the same time, it is low enough to capture incremental changes that do not amount to a full breakdown. For more details, see Lhrmann and Lindberg 2018).
8 https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/ States we used data from the Brennan Center for Justice.
Over the last 40 years, most (63%) democracies were in a state of emergency at least once. From 1974 to 2016, 8.3% of states of emergencies coincide with a period of substantial autocratization, while such episodes occur in just 5.2% of years without a state of emergency.
This comprises 21.7% of the years with democratic decline in our sample. In most cases, such autocratization periods are lethal for democracies. 86% of democracies collapsed during an autocratization episode with a state of emergency and only 14% survived.
Control variables
We first control for the strength of the emergency powers given to the leader during a state of emergency. This allows us to test for the danger of the institutional mechanism of a state of emergency as such rather than the specific powers granted therein. We take this variable from Rooney (2019) . 9 and the measure captures such variation as the breadth of declaration, the existence, scope, and depth of policy powers, as well as limitations on powers via institutional oversight and the expiration of the policies and powers taken during the crisis. We include both this variable and its square, to account for the possibility that the effect of stronger emergency powers dissipates.
We expect the risk of autocratization onset to decrease, the more liberal institutions con- economic gains from oil production is also controlled for, as a common theory states a negative relationship between an oil-based economy and democracy (Ross 2001) . We take this data from the Quality of Government project (Rothstein & Teorell 2008) . Some scholars link globalization to dissatisfaction with democracy and thus an increased risk of autocratization (Crouch 2004) . Data on globalization comes from the Konjunkturforschungsstelle (KOF) globalization dataset (Konjunkturforschungsstelle 2011) , and runs from 0 to 100 with high values indicating more globalization. A high level of political corruption might also affect satisfaction with democracy (Diamond 2008) . We control for this factor with an index from the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al. 2018a; Coppedge et al. 2018b , with 0 indicating low levels of corruption and 1 high levels. Lastly, we also control for economic inequality using Gini data on disposable income from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt 2014) , which runs from 0 to 100, with high values indicating more inequality. The literature is undecided on the direction of the relationship of economic inequality with autocratization. Inequality may bread dissatisfaction with democracy on the side of citizens; at the same time elites may feel threatened by more egalitarianism and then challenge democracy (Haggard & Kaufman 2016) .
Estimation strategy
The dichotomous nature of our dependent variable the occurrence of an autocratization episode in a given year, requires that we use probit models to evaluate our proposed hypoth-esis. We utilize probit models rather than alternative dichotomous variable models given the ability of the probit to account for both non-constant variance in our error and given the lack of extremity in the distribution of our independent variables. To account for potential endogeneity concerns, we lag all independent variables one year. This does not apply for the variables on emergencies, because we are specifically interested in how the declaration of a state of emergency relates to autocratization in a given year. Finally, to help reduce the bias in our standard errors, we use jackknife resampling methods in their calculation.
Results and Discussion
To reiterate, we expect the occurrence of a state of emergency to be positively correlated with the occurrence of autocratization episodes. Model 1 fits the bivariate relationship and
shows -as expected -a positive and statistically significant relationship. Model 2 adds the confounders discussed above. The focal relationship remains strong and statistically significant. The predicted probability of an autocratization episode is .0396 without a declared state of emergency and .0629 with one in place (Figure 1 ). Thus, with a state of emergency countries are 59% more likely to decline than without a state of emergency.
Most confounders show the expected relationships. Emergency powers demonstrate the posited curvilinear relationship with autocratization. Increasing emergency powers increases the likelihood of autocratization until shortly after the mean level of emergency power strength, at which point the effect dissipates before becoming insignificant. Autocratization episodes are less likely to occur the more democratic a country is, the more it grows and prospers economically and the less oil rents a country has. Income inequality is associated with a lower risk of autocratization, which supports the idea that right-leaning elites may lead autocratization efforts in more egalitarian societies. Furthermore, a higher level of political corruption is associated with a decreased risk of autocratization. This runs counter to expectations and needs to be explored more in future research. Notes: Jackknife standard errors in parentheses. All controls are lagged by one year. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01 .06
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Robustness
For robustness purposes, we estimate Model 2 with year-fixed effects (see Table 2 in the appendix). Findings holds even when looking solely at variance within years. 10 We also estimate a model using a different dependent variable: the change in the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) in the year of a declaration of the state of emergency compared to the year prior (see Table 3 in the appendix). Findings hold; a declaration of a state of emergency is associated with a statistically significant decline in the EDI.
Conclusions
Autocratization episodes -a substantial decline of democratic regime attributes -are almost 60% more likely to occur in years with declared states of emergency. This finding is robust to a number of different statistical tests and model specifications. States of emergency present an opportunity structure for leaders to dismantle democratic institutions and resistance to autocratization. As such they are not necessarily a trigger or cause of autocratization or even democratic breakdown. States of emergency are more likely to be declared once a country is in crisis (e.g. Moldova in 1992) or by political leader who aims to circumvent democratic constraints (e.g. Trump in 2019; Chavez in Venezuela in 1999). In other cases -such as Turkey -states of emergency were declared as autocratization was well under way already and were instrumental for the regime to accelerate the process. Thus, we suggest to think of states of emergency as a potential symptom and accelerator of autocratization processes. Like a fever, they are a strong warning sign that something maybe wrong with the state of democracy and that autocratization might be under the way.
Consequently, the public should examine each declaration of a state of emergency with care. Observers should scrutinize the intend of the leader, how severe the situation declared to be an emergency really is and the subsequent use or abuse of the extraordinary powers. Notes: Jackknife standard errors in parentheses. All controls are lagged by one year. Models include year-fixed effects. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All controls are lagged by one year. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < .01
